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ABSTRACT
Ideological debates on the role of government in development
have focused on two contrasting prescriptions: one calling for
large scale government interventions to solve problems of massive
market failures, the other for the unfettering of markets, with
the dynamic forces of capitalism naturally leading to growth and
prosperity. This paper is part of an exploration of a middle
road, focusing in particular on the role of government in
financial markets. After explaining the importance of, and the
limitstions on, capital markets, particularly in allocating
scarce investment resources, the results are used as a basis of a
critique of the two 'extreme' approaches. Recognizing the
limitations of government intervention as well as of free
markets, the 'new viewlr of capital markets provides new insights
into s vaciety of policy issues, which are addressed in the final
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For the past several decades, economists have offered developing
countries two contrasting prescriptions for success. One school of thought
has seen the failure of countries to develop as evidence ofamassive market
failure, and suggested that what is required is massive government
intetvention; at the very least, government should take a central role in
planning, allocating investment and credit, and controlling international
trade.2 The second approach see government more as the problem than as the
solution:hy unfettering markets, the dynamic forces of capitalism would
natnrally load to growth and prosperity.
There is growing diailluaioruaent within the Third World with both of
these extreme approaches. Many governments are groping to find an eclectic
approach, in which governments play a limited, but vital, role in the
developuent process.Those who advocate such "reasonahlc" approaches to
1Noveaber 1990 rcviaion of a paper originally presented at a
conference at the Vargas Foundation Rio de Janeiro, August 7-8, 1989.
Financial snpport from the Olin Foundation, the Hoover Institution, and the
National Science Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. Conversations with
Ron Mcltinnon were particularly helpful.My work in this area has also
benefited greatly from conversations over the yeara with Mark Cersovitz,
Jonathan Eaton, Andrew Weiss, and Bruce Greenwald. An abbreviated veraion
of some parts of the paper appear as "Financial Markets and Development,"
Oxford Review of Econneic Policy, 1989.
2Though the intcllectual origins of this perapective undoubtedly go a
long way hack, in recent decades, this school has attempted to relate the
problems observed in less developed countries to the general 'market
failures approach." This approach begins with the fundamental theorem of
welfare economics, which provides aset ofaasuatptions under which market
economies are Pareto efficient, and then attempts to interpret observed
instancea of deficiencies in market economies can he related to the failure
of spnnitic aaaueptiona within that model being aatitfied
1government policy [ace a difficulty: the two alternative approaches have a
clearly articulated intellectual basis, a framework to which they can appeal
for guidance. Never mind that the underlying assumptions are inappropriate
or that sore of the central ptedictions of the theories supporting one or
theother extremeapproachessaybetefuted:these are reiineeents which
areof concern to academics.The ideology serves a vital functionof
providing ready- -if not always appmopriate--answers to difficult questions.
thepurpose of this paper is to present an outline of some ofthe
ingredientsof the intellectual foundations of the middle approach of
balanced government intervention, focusing in particular on finaocisl
markets, and to explain why I believe itis that the two alternative,
estremeapproaches are so intellectually bankrupt. The two extreme
approaches share in common two factors: an appeal to aimple prescriptions
to solve complex problene, and an explanation of the failures of their
prescriptions to work in those instances where they have been tied to the
patients' foilute tofollow the prescribed course of medicinein its
entirety.
1 focus my attention on the role of government in financial markets.
This is partly because of the general consensus concerning the central role
offinancial msrkets in economic development, partly because of rhe extrese
divergence in views concerning the appropriate role of government in this
sphere.
I begin with two assertions concerning the historical experience of the
roleof financial markets and government in economic development:
1. Governments hsve played a central role--whether for good or ill say
hedebated--inthe development of moat of those countries which today belongamong themore developed. I am particularly concerned here with the role of
government in financial markets. In the United States] the railroads were
given huge land grants, which provided them with an important asset
facilitating raising capital by issuing bonds. Even today. in the US, more
than a quarterofall loans (to private individuals or firms) are made with
gcvernment guarantees or are intermediated by government lending agencies.
In Japan, MITI is believed to have played a central role in determining
which industries get credit. High on the agenda of nationalization in most
countries is the nationalization of the banking industries.
2. Well functioning equity markets have played a relatively
unimportant role in economic development. Even today, in the developed
countries, arelativelysmall fraction efnewfunds is raised on equity
markets.
Most, but not all, ci the successful efforts at development have
entailed enterprises requiring considerable amounta of capital. There are
four principal ways that such egglomerations of capital can be formed: (a)
accumulsticn of capital by families; (b) sccumulation within corporate
enterprises; (c) voluntary agglomeration of capital via capital markets
(including banks) ;and (d)"forced" agglomeration of capital via
gcvernment.3 Successful development requires not only the agglomeration
of capital, but also the appropriate allocation and management of capital.
This entails screening different investment opportunities for those most
3tovernrsent policies may. in effect, channel aavings to large
enterprises within the private sector or be used for large projects within
thu public sector.likely to yield high returns and managing the investment opportunities in a
way to ensure that they live up to thetr potentiala.
The problems of agglomerating and allocating capital are, of course,
closely linked together. When capital is accumulated within families, there
is no separation of ownership and control, ot to put itinthe more
fashionable jargon of modern information economics, no principal agent
problem. The family has a clear incentive to ensure that the funds are well
spent.Of course, if the family has many enterprises to manage, they can
only devote part of their energies to each project, and must engage in
considerable delegation.Thus, principal-agent problems Inevitably arise,
but there is at least a clear incentive to ensure that they be handled as
well as possible.
The heightened sense of egalitarianism in modern societies has
resulted in most governments imposing taxes which inhibit huge family
agglomerations.
Some large agglomerations occur within corporations, but, as we are
increasingly becoming aware, the interests of those who run the corporations!
often are distinctly different from those who nozstnslly own the corporation.
By now, there is a clear body of evidence suggesting at least that in many
instances managers advocate, and undertake, actions which do not maximize
the market value of the firmA
Capital aarkets--providing for voluntary agglomerations--while they crc
of critical importance, face, as we show in the next section, importenc
limitations arising from imperfect and incomplete information.
4The clearest evidence relates to how firms respond to taxes and take-
overs. See Stiglitz (1922a) and Shleifer and Viahny (1968).
4We have increasingly become aware of the limitations of government
within capital markets. Governments compound the standard principal agent
problems with what may be called, for want of a better term, political
economy problems.Providing loans at interest rates which are below the
"actuarially" appropriate rates provides an excellent way for governments to
providehidden subsidies to their friends and supporters: who is to know1
until oc unless the borrower defaults1 that the loan was not one that could
be justified on good business grounds; end even if it is attacked on those
grounds one can always appeal to broader social objectives. The potential
scope of the abuse of public loan programs and the difficulties of
contcnlling those abuses makes such programs problematical, even if one
could justify them on other grounds (a point to which I shall return later.)
From this perspective then, we face a second best problen: none of the
aethods of providing for the agglomeration of capital are without their
deficiencies or difficulties.
This paper is divided into three sections.In the first, I explain
both the importance of, sod the limitations on, capital markets.In the
second. I use these results as the basis of a critique of what I have called
the two extreme approaches to development strategies. In the third, I use
the analysis of Part I to address several policy issues,
5I. Aspects ofthe Theory of Capital Markets
A.On the Inportance of CapitalMarkets
Capitalmarkets perform several critical roles: they aggregate savings
and they allocate funds.In the process of performing these functions,
funds must be allocated not onlyamong competing sectors, but also among
competing management teams (firms). iithin capital markets, banks play a
distinct role: having allocated the funds, banks continue to perform an
importanttask in ensuring thmt the funds are uaed in the way promised by
the borrower, and thmt the horrower, in responding to new contingencies,
takes into account the interests of the providers of capital. At the same
time that they provide these services, they reduce the risks facing savers
by allowing for diversification.
The funds required for undertaking investments of any scale are, aswe
have noted, beyond the means of most entrepceneurs. Banks and other
financial institutions take the relatively small savings of large numbers of
individuals, aggregate them together, and thus make funds available for
larger scale enterprises. This is socially desirable because of the
importance of scale effects: if each individual was limited to the
investments he himself could finance, returns would be correspondingly
limited.This would be an important rcle, even ifallindividuals were
identical, and the bank could, accordingly, allocate the funds simply by
randomly choosing one individual to receive the loan.
Eut individuals are not identical. Some are better managers than
others, and some have better ideas. A central function of finsncielinstitutions is to assess which managers and which projects are most likely
to yield the highest returns.
Moreover, nnce the loan has been made, it is important to mocitor that
the funds are spent in the way promised, and that the project is well
managed.
These two functions of financial institutions are referred to as their
screening and monitoring roles.5
B. Financial Strucrure
The form in which capital is provided has consequences both fnr how
these screening and monitoring functions are performed and the behavior of
borrowers. The three most important forms in which capital is provided are
tqjjt,longterm leans, and short tern loans.
1. Equity
From the perspective of the entrepreneur, equity has two related
distinct advantages. Risk is shared with the provider of capital, and there
is no fixed ohligaticn for repaying the funds.Thus, if times are bad,
payments to the providers of capital are suspended. The firm will not face
bankruptcy, and will not be forced to take the extreme measures intended to
stave off bankruptcy.From a social point of view, equity has a distinct
advantage: because risks are shared between the entrepreneur and the
provider of capital, the firm will not normally cut back production as much
5See SLights and Weiss (1989).
7as it would with debt financer if there is a downturn in the economy. (See
Greenwald and Stigiitz (lPSBb, lSBSc))
But there are some distinct disadvantages of equity. Becauae
entrepreneura do not have a fixed conatitment (and because they must share
the returns to their effort with the other shareholders) incentives are
atteousted, Because shareholders only get a fraction of profits, managers
have an incentive to divert profits to their own uses (not only managerial
perks, but the acquisition of knowledge and skills which improve their
market position).6 Recent literature has stressed how imperfect information
providestheoretical explanations for why take-overs and other markets
mechanisms provide only limited discipline on managerial behavior, and
consequently, fat why managers have considerable autonomy.' These
incentive issues have recently received considerable attention, as instance
after instsnce of cash rich oil, companies squandering the extraordinary
profits they received during the years of high oil profits come to light;
Exxon with its half billion dollar loss on Reliance and Mobil with its loss
on Montgomery Ward are but two of many instances. Indeed, the increase in
value which has been associated with corporate financial restructuring,
There is, by now, considersble empirical evidence for these views,
Managers not nniy expend resources to increase their outside market
value, but they also take actions which make it more difficult for the firm
to replace then. This is referred to as managerial entrenchment. Sac
Shleifer and Vishny (1988).
7See Grossman end Hart (1980) and Stiglitz (l982h, 1985).For a
precursor of these arguments, see Eerie (1926).
8increasing firm debt, is often partly attributed to the fact that with high
debt, managers are forced to work hard--they have their backs to the wall)9
Moreover, those entrepreneurs who are must willing to sell shares in
their fines include those who believe, or know, that the marker has
overvalued their shares.There are, of course, good reasons fur issuing
equities--risk averse individuals with good investment projects, requiring
more capital than they have will also issue shares. But these individuals
snd firms are mingled together with these who see an opportunity to cash in
on the markets' ignorance.And unfortunately, the market cannot easily
distinguish among the two. As a result, there is an adverse signal
associated with issuing new equities- -on average, the value of firms' shares
6Robert Mall has, accordingly, referred to this theory of corporate
finance as the "batks-to-the-wall' theory of corporate finance. Early
studies emphasizing the role of finance in affecting managerial incentives
include Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Stiglitz (1974), who pointed out the
close analogy hetween thetraditional incentive concerns in the
sharecropping literature,and similar problems in modern corporate
enterprises. For a isore recent survey, see Jensen (1968),
5Three other mechanisms for ensuring that those who get fonda froa
others treat the providers of capital in the manner promised should briefly
be noted: (a) Reputation may be effective, if firms wish to re-enter the
capital market to raise capital again in the future. But reputstion
mechanisms are only effective if firms wish to raise additional capital,
and the adverse signalling effect associated with new equity may make firms
particularly reluctant to re-enter the equity market, at leaat for a
codnsiderable period (see Gale and Stiglitz, 1989). Moreover, reputation
mechanisms become particularly ineffective as firms face threats of
bankruptcy. (See Eaton, Cersovitz and Stiglitz [1986] for a general
discussion of these issues.) In LDGs,theabsence of an established
reputation may put new domestic financial institutions at a disadvantage and
serve as a barrier to entry. (b) Fraud and securities laws may impose
important constraints on how firas treat their providers of capital. In
many LDGs, legal systems are, however, both slow and relatively ineffective.
Cc) In traditional societies, trust (ethnic ties) may provide an effective
enforcement mechanism. In the process of developeent, however, these
ties may be weakened, impairing the efficiency with which capital markets function.
9decreases when they issue shares. This serves as an important deterrent to
issuing shares,1
The disadvantages oi equity seen, in most cases, to outweigh the
advantages, even in enre developed economies. Relatively little capital is
raised by new equity issues, and even by secondary equity issues (where a
ptincipal stockholder shares his shares, either so that he can diversify his
portfolio or spend his wealth).
gut the more developed countries have several distinct advantages in
issuing equities that are not available in most LDCs. The existence of
well organized secondary markets for securities makaa equities particulerly
attractive. Itincreasesliquidity andallowseasy portfolio
diversification.
Moreover, the standard accounting procedures (enforced, in part, by the
taxing authorities and hy government securities regulators) reduce the
problems posed by outright managerial cheating. They make it more difficult
for investors to be eislead by shady practices, including Ponri achemes.
Managers can still rip off the firm--in one recent take-over episode, they
walked off with more than a $100 million--but typically, the amount they
take is hut a sisall fraction of the firm's assets.In the early days of
modern capitalist economies there wore numerous instances of stock market
soaas,Given this history, and the apparent ease with which stockholders
can be taken advantage of, it is perhaps remarkable that equities aarkcta
work as well as they do.
10The theoretical arguments are provided in Greenweld, Stiglitz an Weiss
(1984), Stiglita (1982) or Myers and Hajluf (1984). For empirical
evidence, see e.g., Aaquith end Mullins (1986).Nonetheless, we must bear in mind the quite limited role that they play
in raising capital in developed countries.Hopes of raising substantial
amounts of capital in this form within LDCa appear to me to be
unreasonable. 11
Thaevidence is summarized in Mayer, 1989: new share issues, during
the period 1970-1985, as a percentage of net financing, were negative for
Finland, U.K and the U.S. ,andonly 2.2% for Canada and .6% for Germany.
Critics may point out that at certain selected times, stock markets
have raised appreciable amounts of finance. (See, for instance, Taggart
(1985), who cites figures as high as high as 19% for the period 1923-39.)
Taggart notes that the increase in equity issues, from 2% in the 60's to 3%
in the 70's, is largely accounted for by public utility preferred stock
issues; preferred stock does not suffer from some of the "enforcement"
problems associated with common stock; moreover, utilities, because they are
regulated and accordingly heavily monitnred, do not suffer from some of the
other control problems associated with equities in other industries.
Moreover, the temporary success cf a financial instrument in raising
capital provides little evidence for its long run viability. It takes time
for investors to learn about all the relevant attributes of a security, and
it takes managers time to learn about all the ways by which they can
manipulate securities, Thus, income bonds looked like they had risk sharing
advantages over traditional bonds, without the enforcement problems
associated with common stock; yet investors eventually learned that firms
could manipulate the value of income, and that they were inadequately
protected.The income bonds thus grew out of favor,Junk bonds are an
instrument which have recently enjoyed considerable popularity in the United
States.They have higher nominal yields than ordinary bonds; the question
is, are those yields high enough to compensate for the additional risks?
Though experience with these bonds is sufficiently limited that one should
be cautious in drawing conclusions, preliminary evidence suggests that
default rates on junk bonds that have been outstanding for a number of years
are so high that actual returns are no higher than on much safer bonds. A
major receaaion in the United States, with a concomitant high default, would
turn investors away from junk bonds. Scandals in the U.K. equity earket at
the turn of the century contributed to the decline in equity issues there.
(See Kennedy, 1987, for an excellent account of these.)
Today, investors in LOGs bring to bear the full experience of how
equities have been abused, even in societies with fairly well functioning
legal systems. This should make them wary about what would happen in LOGs.
See Greenwald and Stiglita (1989b) for a more extensive discussion of the
develpnent of financial markets snd its relationship with changes in the
legal systems.
112. Short Term Loans
Short term hank loans give the firm much less discretion: finns are on
a short leash. They must make interest payments, and the bank can request
its funds back at each of the due dates. Thus, while nominally.
shareholders control the firm, minority shareholders exercise no effective
control, while banks often exercise considerahie influence over the firm's
actions. Their refusal to renew a loan can have serious sdverse effects on
the firm,andthus firm's have a strong interest in complying with the
demands of the benks. Overseeing loans is, ofcourse,one of the bank's
main economic roles--the role of monitoring noted above.
There Is an important difference between the contractual arrangements
and the true economic nature of the relationship. For the lender can only
force the horrewet to repay the amount due if the borrower hss the funds; if
he does not, he can force the borrower into bankruptcy. But there are often
significant economic costs of doing so, reducing the amount that the lender
will eventually recover. Hence, the borrower can often "coerce" the lender
into extending more credit- -or at least not forcing the borrower to repay
what is due.The borrower knows this, end this may affect his behavior.
(This explaina why banks sre losthe to undercapitalize projects, knowing
that they can be "forced" to extend further credit later.) The experience
with Third World Debt provides ample evidence to the importance of this
'°The view that backs may exorcise more effective control over capitol
than minority shareholders is developed in Earle (1926) and Stiglita
(l9i5)
12phenomena.' The possibility of behavior leading to subsequent "forced
loans" provides banks with further incentives to monitor borrowers.
than markets are distinctly different from the kinds of "auction"
markets characterizing other goods and services. Traditional textbook
oxpositicns characterized loan markets like the market fnr chairs or
tables, with the price (the interest rate) equilibrating supply and demand.
But this view is incorrect. It misses the essential property of loans- -they
are not contemporaneous trades, but an exchange of funds by one party for a
prosise of a return in the future, It misses the essential heterogeneity of
1oan contracts- -thedifferences in the probability of default.And it
misses the essential informational problems- -whilethe lender knows thst
different borrowers differ in the probability of default, he cannot
perfectly ascertain which borrowers have high default probabilities; and
while the lender knows that borrowers can undertake actions which affect the
likelihood that he gets repaid, he cannot perfectly monitor those actions.14
Three important consequences follow: first, the process of allocating
credit (and monitoring its use) is not simply left to the market, with
different borrowers competing for funds by offering to pay higher interest
rates, Banks screen loan applicants. Secondly, because of adverse
selection and adverse incentive effects associated with increases in the
interest rate (that is, as the interest rate charged increases, the
"quslity of the mix of applicants changes adversely, and successful
For an early theoretical discussion of these concerns with short term
debt, see Hellwig (1977) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).For an analysis of
third world debt from this perspective, see Eaton, Ceraovitz, and Stiglitz
(1986)
These arguinants also apply to equities markets.
13applicants undertake riskier projects)'5 ,banksmay not raise interest rates
evon when there is an excess demand for credit.The interest rate doea not
perform its market clearing role. Karket equilibrium may be--and frequently
is- -characterized by credit rationing. Thirdly, loan contracta will have a
variety of provisions other than interest rates, which will affect both the
actions undertaken by borrowers and the mix of loan applicants. While these
non-price terms (such as collateral) may affect the extent of credit
rationing, they do not eliminate it (See Stiglits and Weiss (1986, 1990).)
Moreover, banks may respond to defaults not by increasing the rate of
interest charged on subsequent loans, but by cutting off credit.
Thus, loan markets face different aspects of the three problems of
enforcement, selection and incentives that equity markets face. So long as
the firm does not go bankrupt, the 'enforcement" problem is not as serious:
there is no necessity to having to ascertain what the firm's profits are.
The firm has a simple commitment.But as we suggested, there are still
enforcement prcblem:in the event of bankruptcy, the bank must see to it
that the borrower does not subvert funds; end, as we have argued, the
borrower may attempt to extract more funds from the borrower, under the
threat of bankruptcy.
The selecticn problem in the case of equity focused on firms with low
expected returns; in loan markets, there is also a selection problem, now
focusing on those with high probabilities of default.
The incentive prohlem itt the case of equity markets focused on the
attenuation of managerial incentives. Since borrowers can keep all of what
the firm obtains in excess of what they have borrowed, effort incentives
155ee Stiglits and Weiss (1981).
14are good (And, as we have suggested, these incentives may be reinforced by
firms' concerns about bankruptcy.) But there are adverse risk-incentives:
fines pay insufficient attention to returns in those contingencies where
the lire goes hankrupt.'5 When firms have a high likelihood of default,
these incentive distortions can become quite large.
Finally, while in principle, both providers of loans and equity have an
incentive to monitor the actions of the borrower, lenders may be in a more
effective position for doing so, through their ability to withdraw credit.
And while typically there are many equity owners, each firm has only one or
in any case a few providers of loans.This means that the "public good
problem associated with- monitoring- -of ensuring that the borrower takes
actions which are in accord with the interests of the lenders--ia less for
loans than for equity)7
3. Bonds
Bends represent a half-way house between short term loans and equity.
With a bond, a firm has a fixed comisitment it must pay interest every
year, and it must repay the principal at a fixed date. As a result, all the
problems we have discussed above with loans arise with bonds.
This aspect of the discrepancy between the interests of firma and the
providers of capital was noted in Stiglitz (l972)
1?That is, since all those who provide a particular form of capital are
treated the same, if any one provider takes actions (e.g. monitoring the
actions of the firm) which increases his returns, all other members of the
class are benefited equally.This gives rise to a classic public goods
problem: Firm management is a public good. See Stiglits (1985). Shleifer
and Vishny present evidence that fires in which equity ownership is
concentrated actually do perform more in accord with the intereata of
shareholders -
ISBonds have one significant sdvantage--and disadvantage.Because, the
lender cannot recall the funds, even if he is displeased with what the firm
is doing, the firm is not on a "short" leash, the way it is with loans.
This has the advantage of enahling the firm to pursue long term policies--
but has the disadvantage of allowing the fin to pursue policies which
adversely affect the interests of bondholders. Bond covenants may provide
some restrictions, but these generally only foresee a few of the possible
contingencies facing firms.The recent spate of take-overs and corporate
financial restructuring have significantl.y adversely affected bondholders,
and yet they had little or no say in the proceedings.
There may be second reason why bonds play a relatively saall role in
raising capital, even in major industrial countries There may be en
adverse signal associated with a firm expressing an unwillingness to be put
on a short leash.A firm which knows that it will be undertaking safe
actions, and that its projects are really good will be willing to subject
itself to the continued scrutiny of its bankers. Those who do not want such
close scruriny include those who think there is a high likelihood that
eventually they will fail to pass auater.Thus, even if there were some
economies associated with long term commitments, the market night not
provide these ccmsiitments.5
At the saae time, it must be recognized that the focus on short tern
performance may have adverse long term effects,
16C. Banks versus Markets
In recent years, there has been increasing reliance on markets, as
opposed to banks, as a source of capital. What are the causes of this, and
what are ita consequences?One possible explanation is that transaction
costs may be lover. Competition among banks may be limited (partly because
of the role that iniormatinn plays as a barrier to entry), and firms that
have high public visibility, with a strong financial position, may be able
to raise funds at comparable interest rates, with lower fees, through
markets. Turning co markets to raise funds has one further advantage, hut a
related disadvantage. The firm using the market (e.g. borrowing by issuing
commercial paper or bonds) may be less affected by credit crunches imposed
by monetary authorities,In such periods, firms that rely on hank credit
may find that they either have to do with less credit, or must issue
commercial paper; but in dcing so, they may be at a disadvantage relative to
firms that have done so on a regular basis. On the other hand, firms that
rely on long term bonds for much of their financing may find that rhey can
respond less flexibly to changing circumstances.Firms which are in good
financial strength may perceive themselves as needing this flexibility less,
in which case the willingness to rely on bond finance becomes a positive
signal (as opposed to a negative signal, as suggested above.)
'5This would not, of course, be true if credit markets were like auction
markets with the commercial paper of one firm being a perfect substitute
for commercial paper from another. Potential lenders have to decide whether
a particular firm which is turning to the cozsmericial paper market is doing
so because of the general credit crunch, or because his bank knows that his
credit worthiness has declined, and has cut off credit.
17If market finance is, indeed, less flexible than bank finance, the
change could have important consequences for the Isacroecoomic stability of
the economy: Greenwald and Stiglits (1988b, 1938c), Stiglitz and Weiss
(1990) and Bornonke and Gertler (1989) have argued that financial
constraints play a central role in the economy's business flucruations.
D. The Distinction and Links Between Primary and Secondary Capital Markets
Our discussion so far has focused on the role of capital markets in
raising new capital. The term "capital marketsT' (like the term capital) is
nsed in a variety of ways; most of the activities which go under the rubric
of capital markets are connected only loosely with the primary function
which I have described, of raising and allocating new capital. The markets
on which claims to assets are traded are sometimes referted to as secondary
capital markets. Indeed, only a small fraction of the reacurces of the
financial industry is directed at raising and allocating capital.
Keynes likened the seccndary financial market (the stock market) to a
beauty contest, in which the judges were concerned not with judging who wss
the most beautiful contestant, but who the other judges would think would be
judged the most beautiful contestant (or, perhaps more accurately, he shonid
have said, who the other judges would judge the other judges to judge to he
the most beautiful contescant. .. .)Others(Stiglica, 1982) have suggested
that the stock market might be thought of as a gambling casino. It is
impossible to reconcile behavior in this market with rational, risk averse
individuals.
18While theability of individuals to trade on the secondary market
undoubtedly makes securities mere attractive, Keynes, as well as many more
recent authors (such as }{irshleifer, 1971, and Stiglitz, 1971) have
suggested that ranch of the short term speculative activity has zero or
negative net social value. While it is true that the stock market may be
efficient, reflecting all available information20, that information has
little effect on resource allocations. Firms do not and cannot rely on the
information (whatever that is) communicated by the stock market for making
their production and investment decisions. (See Stiglitz, 1989.) While one
individual, by getting the information earlier than the other, may be able
to "trick" another individual into buying a share from him, or selling a
share to him, these trades only affect who gets society's resources; they do
not affect the level of production. They represent, in other words, private
rent seeking activities.
I stress this because the two aspects of financial markets are often
confused.Much of the recent innovations in financial markets have been
concerned with the secondary market.New instruments have been invented.
Transactions can be recorded sore quickly. But improvements in the
secondary markets do not necessary mean that the economy functions more
efficiently. (Indeed, Stiglitz and Weiss (1989) have shown that some of the
financial innovations, such as faster recording of transactions, may
2°Though if it were truly efficient in that sense, no one would have
any incentive to collect information, and thus the only information which
would be reflected in the market price would be free (although in this case,
that may not mean completely worthless) information. See Grossman and
Stiglitz (1976, 1980).
19actually be unaabiguously welfare reducing.) In particular, the primary
financial markets may not perform their roles any better.21
These observations are important, because they warn ua against
thinking that improvements in secondary financial markets--or decreases in
government regulations of secondary financial markets-- necessarily, or even
normally, will iaprove the efficiency of the economy.
II. A Critique of the Two Paradigms
A. The Market Pmradigsi
Allocating capital is thus a much core complicated matter than the
simple "supply and demand" paradigm suggests.Unfortunately, much of the
simplistic advice given by "free market" economists is based on the
hypotheses that markets fur capital are just like aarkets for chairs and
tables; that competitive markets--whether for chairs, tables, or capital--
ensure Pareto efficient resource allocations; and that policies that move
the economy closer to free market soiuttcns are welfare enhancing.All
three of these presumptions are incorrect. We have already argued against
the first. And there is no Intellectual foundationa for either of the ocher
two,
The second best theorems of Meade and Lancaster and Lipsey long ago
showed thac in crononies in which there were some distortions, removing one
2tThey even may perform their functions less effeotively. Taxing
transactions may reduce noise trading, and hence market volatility.Long
term investors' expected return may be increased, and their risk may be
reduced. See, e.g. Scmmera and Summers (1989) or Stiglitz (1989).
20distortion may not be welfare enhancing. Uhile they did not have in mind
the kinda of problems with which we are concerned here, the baaic lesson
remains valid in this context as well.22
More fundamentally, Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986, 1988) showed that
economies in which markets are incomplete23 or in which inioreation is
imperfect--that ia, all economies--are, in general not constrained Pareto
efficient that is, there almost always exista some forms of quite limited
government intervention, e.g. taxes and subsidies, which respect the
limitations on markets and information which are Pareto improviogJ''
I ahould perhaps distinguish the Greenwald-Stiglitz view from other
market failure approaches to government intervention. Since the formulation
of the Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics, there has been a wall-
articulated view concerning the role of government intervention, which has
been known as the market failures approach. This apprcach identifies
inportant instances where the assumptions underlying the Fundamental Theorem
are not satisfied, and argues for a very seiectfye intervention in the
market co correct those well-identified instances of market failure.For
instance, the presence of pollution cells for a government pollutant tax.
22Ron Mckinnon (1989) provides a good discussion of how liberalizing
financial markets in less developed countries may not have been welfare
enhancing.
23 Several earlier studies showed that eccnonies in which there were
an incomplete set of risk markets were not constrained Pareto efficient.
See, in particular, Newbery and Stigliti (1981, 1982, 1984) and Stiglits
(1982b) -
2Theyshow that several widely discussed examples in the literature
(e.g. the Arrow-Debreu model, or the Diamond (1967) stock market model)
represent special cases in which the market is Pareto efficient.
21The market failures approaches identifies a role for government in
correcting externalities and providing public goods. Beyond that, the
absence of markets into the future provides a basis for government
investment planning,
By contrast, Creenwald and Stiglita argue that market failures crc
pervasive in the economy and that accordingly there is no nigaumption that
the market, left to itself, would be constrained Paretn efficient. They
recognize that this in itself does not constitute a recoismendation for
government intervention: nne must be able to identify the Pareto improving
intervention and one must argue that goverresent policies will actual be
consistent with such Pareto iaproviog interventiona.5The difficulties
associated with each, of these tasks suggests that government intervention
should be selective and aimed at what is likely to be the most significant
instances of market failure.The problems that arise in financial markets
suggest that market as one such candidate.
B. Government as the Solution
While the precise arguments put forward by Greenwald and Stiglitz in
their critique of market solutions may be new, the view that markets do not
provide a good basis for raising aod allocating capital within LDCs (or,
for that matter, in more devaloped countries) is not.In the absence of a
complete act of futures markets, prices cannot perfors that central role of
coordinating investment decisions that traditional price theory ascribes to
In their paper, they relate the desirable government interventions to
empirically observable parameters.
22it. Whether for this or other reasons, many governments have seen the task
of allocating capital as being too important to he left to the private
sector, The socialist platform typically has the nationalization of banks
and other financial institutions high on its agenda.
The central problems which I have discussed are no less problems within
the public sector than in the private.Shifring the locus of decision
saking does not alter the difficulties associated with selection and
monitoring. But to make matters worse, the government often does not have
the incentives to ensure that it (or its ageits) does a good job in
selecting and monitoring loans.The deep pocket of the government means
that any losses can easily be made up.Moreover, since economic criteria
are often supplemented with other criteria (saving jobs, regional
development), losaas can be blamed not on an inability to make judgments
about credit worthiness, but on the non-economic criteria which have been
imposed. The absence of the check provided by the market teat means that
credit can he allocated on the basis of political favoritism: the subsidy
associated with charging a lower rste of interest than the riskiness of the
loan merits is hidden.26
The results of this and the previous subsection oight, at firat, seen
to be ai odds with each other, but they are not. In the previous section,
we showed thee in economies in which there are an incomplete set of markets
or imperfect inforaaticn (virtually all markets) there exists actions by the
government which are Pareto improvements, and which respect thc limitations
26Moreover, even in the absence of corruption, if rationing is optimal,
the ability to choose among loan applicants gives the government an enorsous
saoont of power.
23on the existence of markets and the availability of information. Government
is not given any more powers in these respects than the private sector.5'
When the central result of economic theory was that no government, no ratter
how benevolent or how far sighted, could improve upon the workings of the
private sector, we had no need to call upon a theory of government to
describe what an actual government might do in a particular situation: the
upper hound of what it might achieve was no higher than that of thu private
market, The Greenwald-Stiglitz theorem ssye that there is a potential scope
fcr welfare improving government activity. Whether government action will
actually improve matters is a more delicate question.This subsection of
the paper serves to remind us that governments face the same informational
prohlems that the private sector does, snd in addition faces some "political
economy" problems, difficulties which, in the past, in jppjy(butnot all)
instances have limited the ability of the gcvernmenr to effect welfare
improvements.
But while I am not sanguine about the ability of government to rep)ece
markets as a mechanism for raising and allocating capital, our anaiysis at
least suggests the possibility that there may exist government polities
which will enhance the efficiency--for the social perspective--with which
the market economy raimes and allocates capital. Of course, any analysis of
government policies towards capital markets needs to take into ocoonnt the
fundamental problems (enforcement, selection, incentives) to which we hove
called attention. With this view in mind, I went to discuss several
°7lhere are, of course, still distinctions between the government and
the private sector. The government, for instance, has the power to tax and
to proscribe entry. For a fuller analysis, at a theoretical level, of rho
differences between governnent and other economic organizations, see
Brights (l989b,)
24possible policies. I want to emphasize the tentative nature of this
discussion:the central thrust of my paper is that alternative policies
need to be evaluated from s perspective which takes into account the central
features of capital markets, as I have described there, and the second best
nature of the problem.
III. Renarks on Economic Policy
Banks versus secujities msrkets as sources of funds, The first, and most
obvious implication of our analysis is that the LDCs must expect that firms
within their economies will have to rely heavily on bank lending, rather
than sacuricies markets, as sources of funds. While it may do little harm
for governments to try to promote tha growth of aacuriciaa markets, both
aarkata for equities and long term bonds, these are likely to provide only a
small fraction of the funds firms require.If investors are inadequately
protected, by strong securities and fraud laws, and a judiciary which can
fairly and effectively enforce such laws, there is a high likelihood of
abuses; the resulting loss of investor confidence may have repercussions
well beyond the aecurities directly affected.
Since primarily reliance almost inevitably will be placed on bank
lending, it is importani for governmenta to take actions which improve the
efficiency of the banking system.
For instance, having well definad property rights (say in land)
provides a source of collateral, which facilitates bank lending. A
judiciary which can quickly deal with defaults, at low costs, allowing the
25lender Loseizeand dispose of the collateral again enhances the willingness
of hanks to lend.
Such reforms may seem relatively uncontroversial, compared tn the
suggestions below.
Foreign investment and banks. Many governments of LDCs have been
particularly loath to allow foreign banks to play a major role.I want to
suggest that this policy ipgy be misguided, but in any case, needs to be re-
examinedfrom the perspectives provided inthis paper.
Inall countries, the ratio of banks' net worth to their liabilities is
usually very small.In a sense, banks can be viewed as highly leveraged
firms.Highly leveraged firms are particularly prone to undertaking risks
which are not in the interests of their lenders--here these who have
deposited funds with them.
In the United Ststem (and many other countries) the government provides
depositors with insurance. When the idea of auth insurance was first
broached to President Roosevelt, he reacted strongly negatively, pointing
out (to use our modern terminology) the moral hazard (incentive) problems to
which that insurance gives rise. Though he eventually relented, vith
hindsight, we can see how right he was!28Banks which undertake greater
risk can offer greater intereat rates to depositors, who tan, with impunity,
turn over their funds to the bank, These banks attract funds away from mote
prudent banks. A kind of Gresham'a Law works with a vengeance.
2810 the United States, at the preaent time, not only do a majority of
savings and loan institutions have negative net worth (if their assets were
valued at current market value), but so do a significant frattioo of the
major banks. See Bruishaugh, Carron and Litsn (1989).
26What is at issue is not jusL corruption (though that plays a role as
well)°, but rather judgments about prudent risks. It is evidently
extremely difficult for honk regulators to monitor banks effectively.One
must largely rely on market forces to ensure that banks take prudent
actions. What regulators can do is to try to ensure that the banks have an
incentive to take prudent actions.The maintenance of reputation is one
such incentive. But the cost of losing one's reputation is obviously larger
for a large international hank than for a small local bank.High equity
(net worth) also may be effective.Local banks may find it difficult
raising the required equity.
These arguments suggest that foreign banks and firms may be sore
reliable in siloceting capital efficiently than domestic banks and fitiss.
To put it another way, establishing a reputation is like any other
investment.The process of allocating capital- -when due concern is taken
for the requisite incentives if it is to be done well- -is e capital
intensive process, and foreign banks (and other international companies) may
have a comparative advantage in that process.
At the same time, there may be an infant industry argument for
protection, and, in particular, for limiting external capital flows (which
allnw foreign institutions to serve the role of intermediation30) and the
operation of foreign banks domestically.So long as savers have a choice
between domestic and foreign banks, at comparable tents, they will choose
29The corruption itself may, to some extent, be viewed as endogenous;
the opportunities to profit by dishonesty attract those with such
inclinations.
In several LUCs, capital outflows roughly equal capital inflows.
It is as if funds went to international banks to be intermediated, and then
wore returned to the country of origin.
27the latter.(Lack of) reputation serves as an effective entry barrier for
doaesitc banks: to compensate for the lack of reputation they cannot pay a
higher interest rate, for that (in the by now familiar way) would
oxacorbate both the moral hazard and adverse selection problems.
Domestic firms are not only at a reputation disadvantage; they are also
at a risk disadvantage. International firms can diversify over a wide
portfolio.Even if the domestic banks have a portfolio of assets that is
widely diversified among domestic risks, the common (country) risks which
affect all of them (exchange ri-sks and other macro-economic risks) make
theit portfolios riskier.Hence, even with the same "reputation" and the
same equity base, investors might rationally prefer foreign firms,
While foreign fins may thus have an advantage within the cepitsl
market, they may have an informational disadvantage --they may find it more
difficult to respond to the particular situations which arise in the
country.31 That is why there is much to be gained from a country having its
own entrepreneurs.22 But entrepreneurship is, in part, learned, and to
undertake the learning requires capital. And we have explained why it is
that dozes tic entrepreneurs end banks may find it difficult raising the
requisite capital.
Note that a standsrd argument against the infant industry arguisent
simply doesn't apply in this context: if the idea is a good one, the firs
should be willing to sell at a loss, until its costs are down to a level at
which it could compete effectively. For to sell at a loss, the firm must
31This argument may not be a compelling one against foreign honks
located within the LDCs.
32There are undoubtedly other reasons as well, such as national pride.
28borrow or raise equity, and it is precisely the inability of firms to borrow
or raise equity which is our concern here
Moreover, there may be a distinct difference betwoen private and social
returns, both to entrepreneurship and to providing capital to new
entrepreneurs. Private investors (banks), for instance, are only concerned
with that fraction of the total returns which they can appropriate; society,
more broadly conceived, is coccerned with the total returns to the project
which accrue within the country (thus excluding the surplus returns which
say accrue to foreign investors.)33 '
Morebroadly, foreign hanks, in allocating capital, will have different
objectives than those of domestic banks, so that the disparity between
social and private returns may be particularly large.Foreign banks may
particularly concerned with nationalization, end thus may provide capital to
sectors which appear relatively isajuna from nationalization, and in forms
(with restrictions) that make nationalization less likely and that make it
aore likely that, should nationalization occur, they can recover their
capital.
While these arguments might suggest a role for government credit
markets, the caveats we expressed earlier suggest that other forms of
indirect subsidy may be more effective.Restrictions on foreign banks and
on capital flows out of the country (impeding the efficiency of the
33itiglitz and Weiss (1981) argued that in their model of credit
rationing, there was a distinct disparity between social and private
returns.
Hoff [i989 argues, for instance, that when an entrepreneur
undertakes a new project, it conveys information to other entrepreneurs
about the idiosyncratic properties of the country's production techcology,
returns which that entrepreneur cannot appropriate.
29secondary capital market) oay be cne way of channelling funds to domes tir
cotrepreneurs and of subsidizing domestic banks and corporations. Such
broad restrictions provide domestic investors with incentives to allocate
funds to the best domestic projects/entrepreneurs, and if there is broad
enough competition within the domestic economy--an important caveat- -the
rents obtsined by domestic firms will be limited.
Another caveat is in order As always, a concern needs to be expressed
thst restrictions are not used simply to protect domestic monopolies. Thus,
if one or two banks dorlnate the doncstic banking industry, restrictions on
foreign banks may simply scrvo to protect those firms' monopoly rents.
Those firms may not be particularly efficient allocators of capital, and the
disparity between their interests and a broader sense of national interest
may be no less than the corresponding disparity for foreign banks.Since
in many LDCs, the domestic banking sector is far from competitive, policies
aimed at locking out foreign owned banks located within the country may be
particularly inadvisable,
In the previous section, I argued that restrictions on the secondary
capital markets--on the free flow of funds abroad- -may have sore advantages
in encouraging the development of e domestic financial sector. To
e0000miers used to hearing the contention that governments should try to
'free up" nerkers, this argument may seem strange.
One of the important lessons of the theory of the second best, to which
i referred earlier, is that when there are some important distortions in the
economy, removing one distortion may not be welfsre enhancing. In most
LOTs, there are maoy distortions. Indeed, as we argued esrlier, in markets
30with incomplete risk markets end imperfect information--that is, in all
markets- -thereisno presumption that market allocations will be
(constrained) Pareto efficient, and a fortiori, there is no preauaption that
making one market--the secondary capital market--work sore nearly like the
"ideal" market is welfare enhancing.
Far instance, McKinnon (1988) has argued persuasively that flexible,
unmanaged exchange rates have imposed enormous risk burdens on producers
engaged in international trade, risks which they cannot divest adequately
thrcugh futures sarkets.Oor analysis of limited equity markets suggests
thst these risks may have real--and deleterious--effects.(See, for
instance, Newbery and Stiglits (1981,1984).)
All of this suggests that there are no easy policy answers.In same
cases, governments have (perhaps unintentinnally) served to exacerbate the
prcblems we have identified rather than reduce them, by subjecting the
domestic banking industry to high taxes and arbitrary and capriciouc
cegulation. [ri these cases, "freeing op" the market would seem to nske
gcod policy sense.
Multinationals.Many of the same arguments for why foreign banks may be
able to perform an important role in allocating capital apply to
multinationals, They have one advantage over banks: they typically
provide capital in the form of (what is in effect) equity, While equity has
distinct advantages over debt--it provides more effective risk sharing, and
thus leads firma to act in a less risk averse manner, resulting, in turn,
in the economy being less sensitive to a variety of shocks- -we have seen
that tilts era likely to face particular problems in establishing well
31functioning equity markets. Thus, it may be desirable for governments in
12Cc to recognize the important role that multinationals can play in the
development process, rather than putting impediments in their way,
Risk sharing by government, For the teasons I have explained equity
markets are unlikely to provide effective risk sharing opportunities. Hany
governments, by their tax policies, exacerbate the effects of limited equity
morkets, for the gcvernment shares in the profits, hut shares in the losses
to a much more limited extent.As Domar and Nusgrave (1944) and Stiglitz
(1969) long ago recognized if the government fully shares in gains and
losses,it can actually encoursge risky investment; in effect,the
government enters into every investment as a silent partner.35 Though this
is not the occasion to provide a detailed technical proposal of how this aay
he done, I should note that there are several ways in which governments can
shore risk much more effectively than they do at present,35
Covernrent risk reduction strstegg. In addition, there are poliojes which
the government eon undertake which reduce the riskiness of the environments
in which firms operate, and given the limited opportunities for risk sharing
35Hore recently, Auerbach and Poterhe (1987) have emphasized the
importance, within the United States, of the provisions limiting loss deductibility.
The important difference between the government acting as a silent
equity partner, through the tax system, and the government acting as a
source of credit (as described above) needs to be recognized: in the latter
oaso, the government is given discretion; in the forcer case, the
"partnership" arrangement is automatic, While this partnership srtangemenc
obviously affects incentives (attenuating effort inoentives, accentuating
risk incentives), the question is, on balance, are these incentive effects
positive, or, if negative, suffioiently small to outweigh the government's
revenue gain?
32provided by markets, this can provide a strong stimulus for the economy. In
particular, it can increase both the willingness of firms to borrow (since
the lower the riskiness of the environment, the more they can borrow while
still facing a particular probability of bankruptcy), end the willingness of
banks to lend.
These policies can he both micro-economic and macro-economic in nature.
Stabilizing the price of export crops will not only have a direct effect on
the producers of export crops (assuming that price and quantity are not too
negatively correlated), but will also have an indirect effect; the
variability of income of the producers of export crops gives rise to
variability in the demand for non-traded goods. Stabilizing incomes within
the rural sector will thus result in increased production of non-traded
goods. (See Newbery-Stiglitz, 1981.)
Conclus ions
In the past two decades there has been a major shift in the prevailing
economic paradigm, reflected in our views of economic policy in general, and
development economics and policy in particular.
Earlier discussions focused on the debate between those who believed in
efficient, competitive markets- -for developing as well as developed
countries--and saw government as a major impediment to the efficient
functioning of the economy; sod those who saw pervasive matket failures
requiring government intervention. Among the central market failures which
33they cited was the absence of a complete set of futures and risk ieerkets37,
and accordingly one of the central responsibilities of the government was to
plan and coordinate investment activities. In the yesrs following World War
TI governments of newly independent countries set up Ministries of Planning
to fulfill their responsibilities and to facilitate the development process.
But the absence of futures and risk markets was not pure happenstance.
It reflected more fundamental problems- -includingproblems of imperfect
information, imperfect competition end costly contract enforcement--which
affected all economies. The recognition of the limitations of the
development planning prccess coincided with the recognition of these
linitations of the standard economic paradigm. Withic developed countries,
it was recognized that labor, capital, and product markets worked--in many
instances at least--in a manner markedly different from that depicted by the
conventional competitive demand and anpply snalysia. While this paper has
focused on the problems associated with financial markets, leading to credit
and equity rationing, similar analyses have been conducted of labor and
produnt markets. These problems are, if anything, more pervasive and more
prominent in tDCs than in developed economies.
We have already noted one major implication of this perspective: there
ia no longer any presumption that market solutions are (constrained) Pareto
efficient. but there is another equally important implication: the
problems of imperfect information--including imperfect monitoring--is no
less present in the public sector than in the private. The fact that
noted earlier, the Fundamentsl Theorem of Welfare Economics, which
represented the formalization of Adam Smith's notion of the Invisible 1-land,
requires that there be m complete set of risk and futures markets, Only
under these conditions will competitive markets ensure economic efficiency.
34markets do not work as well as their ardent proponents claus does not mean
that governments can remedy the problem. The absence or limited scope of
financial markets may not be simply because the private sector has failed to
recognize a profitable opportunity. There are, aa we have seen, good
reasons that financial markets look markedly different from the way they are
characterized in old-style textbooks. Governments should at least go
cautiously where private markets fear to tread,
We now recognize that, particularly for small open economies, the
problems of macro-economic coordination stressed in the earlier development
planning literature may be far less important than the micro-economic
problems of selecting (quite specific) projects and choosing good managers
to manage those projects.And we now recognize the difficulty of micro-
managingfrom above--thevirtual impossibility ofspecifyingthe
characteristics (including delivery dates, durability, etc.), and of setting
prices for each of the infinity of possible commodities, We have else come
to recognize the pervasiveness of decentralized planning in market
economies. The old market paradigm wes wrong in may more ways than
suggested by simply the absence of futures markets.35
One of the functions of the economy's financial institutions is not
only to raise capital, but to channel funds to che most profitable
opportunities (the selection or screening function), and to ensure that
those funds are well used (the monitoring function,) We need to think more
about vhat kinds of institutions can most effectively perform these
functions.Centralized government bureaucracies and large public credit
institutions may be poorly situated to perform those functions. But there
38For a more extensive discussion of these issues, see Stiglitz (1989).
35may be ways in which the government can assist in the development of a
variety of institutions which can play an important role.
But much of this paper is predicated on a more pessimistic appreisal.of
the potential role of financial markets in the development process. It has
argued that they play a limited role even within well organized developed
countries, and that their role within the LDCs is likely to be even more
circujastribed. Hence, government policies should be directed at mitigating
the consequences of these inherent--and important--limitations of financial
markets and institutions within LDCa.lThat might be called hsecond• or
"third" heat policies have to be developed. Many current government
poiicies fail to recognize these limitations which fate both the government
and the private sector.I have put forward some quite tentative propoaals
which suggest some ways in which government policy can be designed to
reflect the broad set of concerns which I have raised.
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